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[ MAP ][ PRIVACY-ENHANCING CRYPTOGRAPHY ][ CONFIDENTIAL COMPUTING ]

Map: Composing Primitives

A Map of Content for building real systems by stacking the cryptographic and network primitives in this library. No single primitive solves everything; composition is where security comes from.

updated 2026-10-25 4 min read
Contents

The composition lattice

Each primitive plugs a specific gap. Knowing what each one does (and does not do) is what lets you compose them safely.

Primitive Hides Doesn't hide Pairs well with
TLS Wire content Endpoints, sizes, timing Mixnet, attestation
TEE RAM from OS or cloud Side channels, vendor backdoor Attestation, transparency log
FHE Plaintext during compute Existence and size of inputs ZK proof of correctness
ZK proof Witness Proof statement and result FHE, on-chain verification
PIR Index i Database contents Relays, mixnet for transport
Mixnet Network metadata Volume over long windows Sealed sender, padding
Onion routing Per-hop knowledge Timing correlation Padding, mixnet
Signal Protocol Per-message keys Recipient identity (without sealed sender) Mixnet, MLS for groups
Decentralized name Identity from registrar Identity from blockchain analysis Onion routing, PKARR
Content-addressed storage Byte substitution Availability or confidentiality Encryption, pinning, decentralized names
Self-custody key From custodian From your own device compromise Hardware wallet, multisig

Common compositions

Confidential AI inference

Decentralized name (.eth / PKARR / .onion)
   ↓
Attested TLS bound to enclave-generated key
   ↓
TDX or SEV-SNP confidential VM
   ↓
Confidential GPU mode with protected CPU–GPU transfers
   ↓
Open-weights LLM + reproducible build hash
   ↓
Transparency-logged release (à la Apple PCC)

Files: Confidential-AI-Inference, Private-LLM-Inference-Patterns, NVIDIA-GPU-TEE, Attestation-Architecture.

Private query over public data

Client query
   ↓
PIR (single- or multi-server)
   ↓
Optional: ZK proof of correct database state
   ↓
Transport: Tor or Nym

Files: Overview - Private Information Retrieval, Overview - Mix Networks.

Censorship-resistant payment

Bitcoin keypair (self-custodied)
   ↓
Lightning channel
   ↓
Onion-routed HTLC payment
   ↓
Receiver: BOLT12 or LNURL with attested proof

Files: Overview - Financial Sovereignty, Lightning Network Deep Dive.

Sovereign social account

Nostr keypair (signing key)
   ↓
NIP-17 gift-wrapped DMs (sender hidden; recipient tag visible)
   ↓
Blossom for media blobs (SHA-256-addressed, mirrored)
   ↓
Public-key identity; optional NIP-05 alias via DNS and HTTPS
   ↓
Multiple relays (transport redundancy)
   ↓
Lightning zaps for monetization

Files: Overview - Encrypted Messaging, Nostr Deep Dive, Blossom, Overview - Decentralized DNS.

Sovereign off-grid node (Blackbox-style)

Local LLM inference (Ollama or equivalent, no cloud API)
   ↓
LoRa mesh (Meshtastic / MeshCore / Blackout Comms)
   ↓
Offline maps (TAK / equivalent, no Google)
   ↓
Cashu ecash + Bitcoin (blind tokens + self-custody, no bank)
   ↓
E2E encrypted request/response chunked over mesh (~200B packets)

One laptop + $30 radio. Zero internet, zero banks, zero datacenters. See MeshCore, Cashu and Chaumian Ecash, off-grid files, and MOC - Censorship Resistance. Composes local confidential compute with air-gapped comms and private money.

Durable public artifact

Release artifact or static site
   ↓
Hash and sign locally
   ↓
IPFS for content-addressed distribution
   ↓
Arweave for archival copy
   ↓
ENS / PKARR / signed index points to both

Files: Overview - Decentralized Storage, IPFS and Filecoin, Arweave, Overview - Decentralized DNS.

Verifiable confidential computation

Client sends encrypted input
   ↓
Server runs computation under FHE
   ↓
Server attaches a SNARK proving the function was the agreed one
   ↓
Client verifies SNARK in milliseconds, then decrypts result

This is the vFHE (verifiable FHE) pattern. Either of these alternatives also works:

  • FHE evaluator inside an attested TEE. The TEE attestation replaces the SNARK.
  • Threshold FHE with active-secure honest-majority MPC. The protocol detects misbehavior.

Files: Overview - Fully Homomorphic Encryption, Overview - Zero-Knowledge Proofs, Overview - Confidential Computing.

Hardware-protected ecash mint (deployment pattern)

Bitcoin/Lightning reserves (self-custodied or on-chain visible)
   ↓
Cashu mint logic running inside attested TEE (keys generated in enclave, never exposed to host)
   ↓
Remote attestation + transparency log (client verifies correct code + measurement)
   ↓
Blind signatures issued; users hold bearer tokens offline / over Nostr / mesh
   ↓
Redemption still depends on the mint; evaluate code, reserves, rollback and hardware trust

Direct 01 + 06 composition. See Cashu and Chaumian Ecash and confidential computing attestation files. Moves from "trust the mint runner" to "trust the hardware root + audited enclave code."

Post-quantum migration of everything

For each long-term-secret protocol (TLS, SSH, Signal, age-encrypted backups):
   1. Switch to a hybrid KEM (X25519 + ML-KEM-768/1024)
   2. Rotate signing keys to ML-DSA or hybrid Ed25519+ML-DSA
   3. Audit the symmetric key sizes — AES-256 stays
   4. Plan re-encryption for archived ciphertexts under new keys

Files: Overview - Post-Quantum Cryptography, Glossary (Hybrid KEM, Harvest now decrypt later).

Anti-patterns

These look decentralized or private only on the surface:

  • Custodial "non-custodial": exchange holds your keys but calls itself non-custodial.
  • CDN'd onion service: operator's identity revealed via Cloudflare logs.
  • Signal Desktop on a compromised OS: E2EE does not help if the endpoint is malware.
  • Nostr without NIP-17: DMs leak the social graph to relays.
  • TEE without attestation enforcement: the server runs in a TEE, but the client never checks.
  • FHE without verifiability: the server can return garbage and the client cannot tell.
  • Self-custody without a backup plan: losing the key is the same as a custodian losing your funds.

Files most relevant

Every Overview in this library. Start with Research Methodology's evaluation criteria, then pick the relevant overviews and build a stack.

Primary sources

Also in Confidential Computing

Page history

Updated
2026-10-25
Origin
Compiled from the ungovernable.tech research notes.
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