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ZKML: Zero-Knowledge Machine Learning

Also ZK Machine Learning, Verifiable ML.

Cryptographic proofs that a specific model produced a specific output for a specific input, without revealing the model, the input, or both. The intersection of ZK and ML is shifting from "research toy" to "deployed primitive" in 2024-2026, with concrete production applications in confidential AI inference, attested AI agents, and verifiable machine-learning pipelines.

Experimental updated 2026-04-25 5 min read
Contents

What ZKML provides

Three orthogonal properties; pick which combinations you need:

Goal Hides input Hides model Proves output
Verify-only No No Yes
Private-input verification Yes No Yes
Private-model verification No Yes Yes
Fully private inference Yes Yes Yes

The most common ZKML pattern in production is verify-only. A user (or auditor) wants to know "this output came from running model M on input X". Neither input nor model is private, but the user wants cryptographic proof rather than the operator's word.

For full privacy, ZKML competes (and composes) with FHE and TEEs:

Technique Hides Trust
ZKML Witness from verifier (model and/or input) Math + prover correctness
FHE Plaintext from compute provider Math (lattice hardness)
TEE RAM from cloud / OS / hypervisor Hardware vendor

The cost problem

A medium-sized neural network forward pass involves billions of arithmetic operations. Naively SNARKing a forward pass produces an enormous circuit. The 2022 state of the art could prove a small CNN inference in tens of minutes; large transformers were impossible.

Folding schemes (Folding Schemes) and lookup arguments changed this. Per-layer or per-operation folding lets you prove inference incrementally. Lookup arguments make non-arithmetic operations (ReLU, softmax, attention) cheap.

By 2024-2026, ZKML proving for small-to-medium models is practical:

  • ResNet-50 in seconds to minutes.
  • BERT-base in tens of minutes.
  • Small transformers (~7B params) in hours, with hardware acceleration.
  • Frontier-scale (~70B+) still impractical for full proofs.

Major ZKML frameworks (2026)

EZKL

Open-source, Halo2-based ZKML compiler. Takes ONNX models as input; generates Halo2 circuits for inference proving. Used in production for verifiable model serving, on-chain ML, and AI auditing.

Workflow:

your_model.onnx ─► ezkl ─► Halo2 circuit + setup
inference call → ezkl prove → SNARK proof of (input, output, model_hash)
on-chain or off-chain verifier checks proof

Strong tooling; the most-used ZKML framework in production.

Risc0 / SP1 / Jolt for ML

Rather than compile the model into a custom ZK circuit, run it inside a RISC-V zkVM. Trade-off: simpler developer experience (just regular code), worse performance than circuit-specific provers like EZKL.

For small or experimental models, this is the path of least resistance.

Giza

ZKML platform built on Cairo / StarkNet. Targets verifiable AI agents on-chain.

Modulus Labs

Production ZKML for on-chain AI services. Demonstrated verifiable inference for trading bots, DAO decision-makers, and AI-driven oracle systems.

Lattigo + ZK / hybrid systems

Some research combines lattice-based ML primitives (FHE-style) with ZK for the proving layer.

Use cases

Verifiable LLM endpoint

Pattern: a model owner publishes the model hash; the inference operator generates a ZK proof that "this output came from running model M on input X." The user verifies the proof and decrypts the output.

Composition:

Model owner ─► commit model hash on-chain
User       ─► input → operator's API
Operator  ─► run inference, generate ZK proof of (input, output, model_hash)
User       ─► verify proof, accept output

This is the verify-only pattern. For input privacy, combine with TEE or FHE.

On-chain AI agents

A smart contract acts as a buyer or arbitrator that needs AI judgment. A ZKML proof lets the contract verify "this AI's judgment came from running this model on these inputs" without trusting the AI service. Used for: oracle computations, prediction markets, verifiable ML-driven yield strategies.

Privacy-preserving model serving

A medical model is run on patient data; the patient gets a diagnosis with proof of correct execution. Combine with FHE or TEE for input privacy. ZKML proves the diagnosis came from the agreed model; FHE / TEE keeps the input data confidential.

Verifiable model audits

A regulator wants to verify that a deployed model is the same as the one passed audit. Hash the model post-audit; require ZKML proofs that production inferences come from that hash.

AI-output watermarking and attribution

Combined with cryptographic signatures, ZKML can prove "this output came from this model at this time", a content-attribution primitive useful in disputes about generated content.

Architecture patterns

ZKML + TEE

Operator runs the model in a TEE (TDX + H100 CC), generating an attested TLS endpoint. The TEE also generates a ZKML proof for each inference. The ZK proof can be verified by parties that don't trust the hardware vendor; the TEE attestation guarantees the proof was generated honestly.

Result: defense in depth. TEE for confidentiality, ZK for verifiability without TEE trust.

ZKML + FHE

Input encrypted under FHE; operator runs the model homomorphically; outputs encrypted ciphertext. ZKML proof certifies the homomorphic computation matches the agreed model. (This is essentially vFHE (FHE Bootstrapping and Verification) specialized to ML circuits.)

ZKML standalone

For verify-only use cases where input and model aren't sensitive, just proving the model ran correctly. Cheapest ZKML option.

Performance snapshot (early 2026)

Model Framework Prove time Proof size
MLP (tiny) EZKL seconds ~10 KB
ResNet-50 EZKL minutes ~30 KB
BERT-base EZKL or zkVM tens of minutes ~50 KB
Llama-7B (research) Specialized provers hours ~100 KB
Frontier (Llama-70B+) Outside practical proving range today — —

GPU acceleration (Cysic, Ingonyama) reduces these by 10-50x for supported pipelines. Folding schemes are bringing per-layer costs down.

Trade-offs

Strengths

  • Cryptographic verification of ML, no operator trust required.
  • Composable with FHE and TEEs for orthogonal protections.
  • Production tooling maturing rapidly (EZKL, Modulus, Giza).
  • Auditable AI. Regulators and users can verify deployed models.

Limitations

  • Prover cost. Minutes-to-hours for non-trivial models.
  • Frontier-scale impractical. 70B+ models out of reach for full ZK proofs.
  • Quantization required. ZKML works in fixed-point fields, not floats. Models must be quantized; precision loss can affect output.
  • Trusted setup for some Halo2 deployments (mitigated by transparent variants).
  • Operational complexity. Managing model hashes, circuit setups, and verifier contracts adds infrastructure burden.

Attack surface

Attack Mitigation
Quantization-induced output divergence Match quantization scheme prove-side and inference-side; deterministic models
Prover supplies wrong input commitment Bind input to public commitment; verifier checks
Model substitution Model hash committed publicly; verifier checks
Soundness bug in circuit Audit circuit code; formal verification
Side-channel on prover Constant-time proving libraries
Model exfiltration via inference oracle Compose with FHE / TEE for input privacy

Recent developments (2024-2026)

  • EZKL stabilizes as the production ZKML framework.
  • Folding-based ZKML brings per-layer proving into reach.
  • GPU prover acceleration drops prove times by 10-50x.
  • Verifiable AI agents on-chain (Modulus, Giza demonstrations).
  • AI watermarking plus ZKML combinations explored for content-attribution.
  • Model-on-FHE-with-ZK research for full vFHE ML.

Primary sources

  • Liu, Xie, Zhang, zkCNN: Zero-knowledge Proofs for Convolutional Neural Networks, CCS 2021.
  • ZKonduit / EZKL — github.com/zkonduit/ezkl.
  • Modulus Labs — moduluslabs.xyz.
  • Giza — gizatech.xyz.
  • Risc0 / SP1 / Jolt for ML.
  • zkML survey (assorted 2024-2025 papers — see arXiv cs.CR cross-listings).

Also in Decentralized Compute

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Updated
2026-04-25
Origin
Compiled from the ungovernable.tech research notes.
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