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TLSNotary

Show selected parts of a website response while withholding the rest of the session.

Experimental updated 2026-10-25 2 min read
Contents

Summary

TLSNotary lets a prover demonstrate the origin of selected data from a TLS session. Its default MPC-TLS mode involves another participant in the cryptographic computation, without showing that participant the session plaintext. The website sees a normal TLS connection.

How it works

  1. The prover and verifier jointly operate the TLS session using multi-party computation.
  2. The prover selects which transcript data to disclose.
  3. The verifier checks the evidence and interprets the disclosed application data.

In the notary arrangement, a separate participant performs the MPC step and signs commitments to the transcript and server identity. The prover can later present selected data to a verifier that trusts this notary. The protocol introduction distinguishes this portable arrangement from direct verification.

Trust model / threat model

The verifier must authenticate the notary's signing key and decide to trust it. A notary colluding with the prover defeats that reliance. The verifier also relies on TLS server authentication and the certificate-authority system for the claimed origin.

Selective disclosure needs an application-specific parser. A verifier must check that the disclosed field belongs to the expected response and has enough surrounding context to support the claim. The verification documentation describes checking commitment openings, TLS-specific data and server identity before parsing the revealed transcript.

This establishes provenance within those assumptions. It does not establish that a website's statement is true in the outside world. A balance, name or timestamp has only the meaning the application can justify.

Readiness

Experimental. The canonical repository explicitly says the software should not be used in production and warns of bugs and major breaking changes. Use disposable test accounts and non-sensitive demonstrations while evaluating an integration.

Limits

The introduction documents TLS 1.2 support and places TLS 1.3 on the roadmap. It also describes a separate proxy mode with a network-path assumption; its security model should not be silently substituted for MPC-TLS.

Redaction itself reveals the selected bytes. Proving a predicate about hidden bytes requires additional proof machinery. Compare zero-knowledge proofs and verifiable credentials before choosing a website transcript as your evidence format.

Primary sources

Also in Identity, Social and Trust

Page history

Updated
2026-10-25
Origin
Written for ungovernable.tech.
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