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Hyphanet and Freenet

Also Hyphanet, Freenet (legacy), Freenet Project, Locutus.

A 25-year-old anonymous content-publishing network, built on small-world routing over a peer-to-peer key-addressable store. In 2023 the project renamed itself "Hyphanet" because Ian Clarke (its original author) reused the "Freenet" name for an unrelated newer project. The disambiguation matters: the two systems share a name in popular memory and almost nothing else.

Usable updated 2026-04-26 6 min read
Contents

Naming, briefly

The Freenet Project, started in 1999-2000 by Ian Clarke at the University of Edinburgh and continued under the Freenet Project Inc. nonprofit, is a censorship-resistant content-store P2P network. In 2023 it renamed itself to Hyphanet to free the "Freenet" name.

Concurrently, Ian Clarke launched a new project — also called Freenet (sometimes "Freenet 2024" or its codename Locutus) — that is a completely different design: a decentralized application platform with a contract / state model, more in the spirit of a distributed Substrate or NEAR than the old anonymous datastore.

This file covers Hyphanet (the original anonymous datastore, 2000-present, formerly Freenet). The Locutus / new-Freenet project is mentioned only for disambiguation.

What Hyphanet is

Hyphanet is a P2P network whose nodes pool storage and bandwidth into a globally addressable content store. You insert a file by encrypting it under a key, computing the storage key (a hash of that key), and pushing the data into the network. Anyone who knows the URI can retrieve it; nobody (including the inserter, after enough time) can prove who originally published any given block.

It is not a chat system, not a web overlay, not a mesh radio protocol. It is closer to "anonymous BitTorrent crossed with a key-value store, with publishing deniability as a core property."

Use cases historically: dissident publishing, leaked documents, anonymous blogs (FMS / FlogHelper / Sone / Frost), discussion boards, file mirrors that needed to outlive the original publisher.

How it works

Content-addressable store

Files are split into blocks. Each block is encrypted and stored on multiple nodes by content-derived key. Hyphanet supports several URI types:

URI Meaning
CHK (Content Hash Key) URI = hash of encrypted content + decryption key. Immutable; same content always has same CHK.
SSK (Signed Subspace Key) A signing keypair owns a namespace; updates to a path are signed.
USK (Updatable Subspace Key) Versioned SSK; clients track the latest version.
KSK (Keyword Signed Key) Human-readable keyword; insecure but easy.

CHKs are the workhorse. The decryption key is part of the URI itself — a friend who knows the URI can decrypt; a node storing the block cannot.

Small-world routing

Each node keeps connections to a handful of peers (typically 5-50). Nodes are ranked along a ring of "locations" between 0 and 1. Routing a request for key K means: forward to the peer whose location is closest to K, and have them do the same.

This is small-world routing in the Watts-Strogatz / Kleinberg sense. With enough random long-range links, requests find their target in O(log N) hops on average even though no node has a global view.

The locations are self-organized: a node observes which keys it gets requests for and slowly drifts its location toward the average. Over time the network achieves a "swap-able" equilibrium that supports efficient routing.

Caching as a side effect of routing

A request for key K travels through several peers. Every peer on the success path caches a copy. Popular content propagates organically; rarely-requested content eventually drops from the network.

This is what Hyphanet means by "store on demand": you don't pin content; you publish it and hope it gets requested often enough that the caches keep it alive. Files that nobody asks for fall off in days to weeks.

Two operating modes: opennet and darknet

This is Hyphanet's defining innovation:

  • Opennet — your node accepts connections from any peer. Easy to bootstrap, anyone can find you; weak against traffic-analysis adversaries because anyone can become your peer.

  • Darknet (friend-to-friend, F2F) — your node only peers with people whose public key you have manually added. The network outside your friend-of-friend horizon is completely invisible to a passive observer. This is the "deniability mode" that early-2000s Hyphanet documentation emphasized.

Most users run opennet. Activists and dissidents in hostile network environments are intended to run darknet.

Threat model

What Hyphanet is meant to resist

  • Pseudonymous publishing. No node can reliably prove which peer originated a given block; routing and caching mean the block has been seen by many peers before any observer arrives.
  • Plausible deniability of stored content. Your node's local storage holds a datastore.bdb-style keystore of encrypted blocks. You cannot decrypt them without the URI. The classic argument is: if you don't know the URI, you don't know what your node is storing, so storage doesn't imply consent.
  • Censorship resistance for published content. Once a CHK has propagated, removing it requires either every cache to drop it or the network to be shut down.

What it doesn't resist

  • Traffic-pattern analysis by an adversary observing many nodes. Hyphanet is not a mixnet; cover traffic is limited.
  • Active attackers running many opennet peers can perform Sybil-style positioning attacks to surveil specific keys (the well-known Mobile Attacker Source Tracing / MAST work, McCoy & others, 2010s).
  • Endpoint compromise. Nothing protects you if your node's filesystem is read by an adversary with the keys.
  • Legal-jurisdictional pressure on operators who store content. The deniability argument is technical; courts may or may not accept it.

The University of Edinburgh and TU Dresden published a series of papers on Hyphanet's security properties in the late 2000s; Ben Roberts and others have analyzed the protocol over the years. The general academic consensus: Hyphanet's threat model holds against passive observers and against limited active attackers, weakens against well-resourced active attackers running many peers.

Architecture today

The current Hyphanet codebase is Java, descended from the original 2000 implementation. It runs as a daemon on Windows, Linux, and macOS, exposes a localhost web UI on port 8888, and supports applications via a FreenetClientProtocol (FCP) socket.

Applications layered on top:

  • Freesite publishing — static websites accessible via a Hyphanet URI, browsed through the Hyphanet web UI.
  • FMS (Freenet Message System) — anonymous bulletin boards.
  • Sone — Twitter-style microblogging with pseudonymous identities.
  • Frost — older message system, mostly retired.
  • FlogHelper — blog publishing tool.
  • Web of Trust (WoT) — a Hyphanet-internal pseudonymous identity and trust system; not the OpenPGP web of trust (see Overview - Web of Trust).

Codebase: github.com/hyphanet/fred. "fred" stands for "Freenet REference Daemon."

Comparison

Property Hyphanet Tor onion services I2P eepsites IPFS
Anonymous publishing Yes (deniable) Yes (operator anonymous) Yes No
Anonymous reading Yes Yes Yes No
Persistent storage without operator Yes (caching) No (operator must stay up) No Pinned by participants
Latency Slow (seconds-minutes) Slow Slow Fast (when content is online)
Active adversary resistance Weak in opennet, strong in darknet Strong Strong None
Active in 2026 Yes (small) Very active Active Very active

Hyphanet's distinctive niche is the combination of anonymous publishing with operator-independent persistence plus the darknet F2F mode. No mainstream successor offers exactly that combination.

Disambiguation: Locutus / new-Freenet

The new "Freenet" (sometimes Freenet 2024, sometimes Locutus) is Ian Clarke's redesign as a decentralized application platform. It uses small-world routing as well, but the unit of state is a "contract" — code + data with update rules — not an immutable content blob. Think of it as closer to NEAR or a smart-contract platform than to anonymous publishing.

If you read documents written before 2023 referring to "Freenet," they almost certainly mean Hyphanet. If you read post-2023 marketing material at freenet.org, that is the new project. The two have different goals, different code, different threat models.

Operational notes

  • Run Hyphanet on a machine with reasonable disk (20-100 GB) and reasonable bandwidth (a few Mbps up). Slower nodes do work but slow down their peers.
  • For sensitive use, run darknet only with a small set of manually-added peers you trust. Opennet is a softer target.
  • Treat freenet.org / hyphanet.net URIs as public; assume traffic-analysis adversaries see request patterns even in darknet.
  • Don't store URIs on systems an adversary can search. The URI is the decryption key.

Primary sources

  • Clarke, Sandberg, Wiley, Hong, "Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System" (ICSI Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability, 2000).
  • Hyphanet (formerly Freenet) — hyphanet.org.
  • Hyphanet source (fred) — github.com/hyphanet/fred.
  • The 2023 rename announcement — hyphanet.org/pages/news.html.
  • Roos, Beverly, Strufe, "Provable polylogarithmic-time routing in distributed networks" (2015), formal analysis of small-world routing of the kind Hyphanet uses.
  • Roberts, "Routing in the Dark" — analyses of darknet F2F routing.
  • New Freenet / Locutus (separate project) — freenet.org. Disambiguated from Hyphanet.

Also in Anonymity Networks

Page history

Updated
2026-04-26
Origin
Compiled from the ungovernable.tech research notes.
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