State: early 2026. This space moves quarterly; verify before committing.
Capability matrix
| Capability | Azure | AWS | GCP | Oracle OCI | IBM Cloud | Alibaba |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intel SGX (app enclaves) | DCsv3 (GA) | — (deprecated in cloud) | — | — | — | ECS ebmre6p (GA) |
| Intel TDX (CVM) | DCesv5 (GA) | Roadmap | c3-standard-* (TDX) | — | LinuxONE-adjacent only | ECS g8i (GA) |
| AMD SEV-SNP (CVM) | DCasv5 / ECasv5 (GA) | Selected M6a/C6a/R6a sizes; check tenancy and region requirements | N2D Milan (GA June 2024); C3D uses SEV (not SNP) | E5 (GA) | — | ECS g7a (GA) |
| NVIDIA H100 CC | NCC H100 v5 (GA) | — (roadmap) | A3 Confidential (preview as of late 2025) | BM.GPU.H100.CC (GA) | — | — |
| Nitro Enclaves (non-DRAM-encrypted VM isolation) | — | Supported Nitro instance types, with exclusions | — | — | — | — |
| Attestation service | Microsoft Azure Attestation (MAA) | KMS attestation conditions + Nitro attestation | Confidential Space attestation | OCI attestation (beta) | HPVS attestation | Alibaba-specific |
| Key release service | Azure Key Vault Secure Key Release | AWS KMS with attestation conditions | GCP KMS + Confidential Space | OCI Vault | HPCS | KMS |
| Confidential Containers / CoCo support | AKS CoCo preview | EKS via peer-pods (community) | GKE Confidential GKE Nodes (SNP) | OKE (community) | IBM HPVS | ACK |
| Confidential GKE / AKS at scale | AKS Confidential | EKS (partial) | GKE Confidential Nodes GA | OKE CC | — | ACK |
Provider-specific notes
Microsoft Azure
- The broadest SKU catalog. Currently the only public cloud with SGX, TDX, SEV-SNP, and H100 CC at the same time.
- Azure Attestation (MAA) is mature, multi-platform, and returns a JWT a relying party can verify.
- Secure Key Release (SKR) in Key Vault with Managed HSM is the strongest KMS-gating story among the majors.
- Confidential AKS integrates CoCo and Kata.
- Caveat: MAA is an Azure-operated verifier. For strongest assurance, verify raw quotes against Intel/AMD directly, not via MAA alone.
AWS
- Nitro Enclaves are AWS's in-house solution: isolated mini-VMs carved out of a parent EC2 instance, with signed attestation documents. Not encrypted DRAM. Isolation is hypervisor- and silicon-level via Nitro, not memory encryption. For many threat models this is enough because the Nitro hypervisor is smaller and more trusted than a general-purpose hypervisor, but it is a different model than SGX/TDX/SEV-SNP.
- AWS documents SEV-SNP support for selected M6a, C6a and R6a configurations, with separate requirements for Shared, Dedicated Instance and Dedicated Host tenancy.
- KMS plus Nitro attestation conditions is the cleanest KMS-gated-key pattern in the industry. A single IAM policy clause can enforce "only release key to enclave with PCR0=X."
- No GA H100 CC yet. Watch Trainium and Inferentia; AWS is building in-house confidential accelerators.
Google Cloud
- Pioneered public-cloud SEV-based Confidential VMs in 2020.
- Confidential Space is a serverless-style product that packages a hardened Confidential VM, attestation, and workload identity federation to GCP APIs. A good default for multi-party computation and attested workloads.
- GKE Confidential Nodes provides SNP nodes at scale; TDX is in preview.
- A3 Confidential is the main offering for confidential LLM inference with H100 CC.
Oracle OCI
- Fewer SKUs but aggressive on H100 CC bare metal. Notable because you own the whole node, removing co-tenant side channels.
- OCI Vault and attestation are less mature than Azure or AWS; you will do more plumbing.
IBM Cloud
- Hyper Protect Virtual Servers use IBM Z Secure Execution (s390x), a different TEE history from x86 with strong pedigree for regulated finance and health.
- Not relevant to NVIDIA GPU confidential inference today.
Alibaba / Tencent / Huawei
- Alibaba ECS has SGX, TDX, and SNP offerings. Attestation collateral flows through Alibaba's own services. Relevant for APAC deployments; audit the trust chain carefully because the operator's verifier is also the cloud operator.
Decentralized and specialist operators
- Phala, Marlin, Oasis, Secret Network, Fluence: TEE marketplaces where nodes are community-operated, attestation is verified on-chain, and payment is usually crypto.
- CoreWeave, Lambda, Crusoe, TensorWave: GPU-specialist clouds. H100/H200 CC availability varies, and these often require bring-your-own orchestration.
- Tinfoil, Edgeless, Anjuna, Fortanix: layer atop the majors with hardened images and attestation UX.
Choosing a provider
| You care about… | Go with |
|---|---|
| Fastest path to confidential LLM inference | Azure NCC H100 v5 or GCP A3 Confidential |
| Strongest KMS-gating UX | AWS KMS + Nitro Enclaves / SNP |
| Confidential Kubernetes at scale | GCP Confidential GKE or Azure Confidential AKS |
| Bare-metal, no co-tenancy | Oracle OCI or CoreWeave |
| Regulated finance/healthcare (EU/US) | Azure Confidential + Fortanix, or IBM HPVS |
| Minimum trust in cloud operator | Decentralized TEE marketplace (Phala, Marlin) + third-party verifier |
| Open-weights LLM for end users | Tinfoil, Phala, or self-host on Azure/GCP with an open verifier |
The trust-is-not-free small print
Every cloud provider controls: - The BIOS and bootloader you cannot audit remotely (though they are measured and attested). - The attestation service endpoints (unless you bring your own verifier). - Key management infrastructure (unless you use split-key or external KMS). - Network routing and egress logging. TEEs do not hide traffic metadata. - Supply-chain access to silicon. A cloud can in principle receive silicon the vendor is not shipping elsewhere.
Confidential computing reduces the cloud's plaintext-access surface dramatically; it does not remove the cloud from your threat model. Pair with transparency logs, multi-vendor quorum, or on-chain verification when you need to actually minimize cloud trust.
Primary sources
- Azure confidential computing products
- AWS EC2: AMD SEV-SNP
- AWS Nitro Enclaves requirements
- Google Cloud Confidential VM supported configurations
- Google Cloud Confidential Space
- Oracle Cloud confidential computing
- IBM Hyper Protect Virtual Servers
Page history
- Updated
- 2026-10-25
- Origin
- Compiled from the ungovernable.tech research notes.
- Improve this page
- Suggest an edit — issues and pull requests are welcome.